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Capital Inflows, Credit Booms and Their Risks 
Carmen M. Reinhart1 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, NBER and CEPR 
This paper highlights the findings of some of the recent research on capital flows, credit 
booms, and their attendant consequences for asset prices, business cycles, financial crises and 
the interaction among these. The aim is to condense key results from the relevant literature and 
promote discussion on how financial and economic developments in China in recent years fit 
within established patterns detected in the broader cross-country and historical experience 
encompassing advanced and emerging market economies across most regions. The big question 
posed is whether taken together these developments describe the antecedents of a banking crisis 
with its potential severe consequences for economic activity or a milder soft landing scenario. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This paper was prepared for the CF-40-PIIE Conference held in Beijing April 27-28, 2012. 
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Introduction 
Capital inflows bonanzas have become more frequent after restrictions to international 
movements were lifted in most countries over the last three decades.2  Capital flows to emerging 
economies can finance investment and foster economic growth, as well as increase welfare by 
facilitating consumption smoothing. However, inflows may also induce excessive monetary and 
credit expansions, complicate monetary policy, build an assortment of financial vulnerabilities, 
and distort asset prices.  Large inflows tend to be associated with expansionary economic 
policies that often behave procyclically.3  These linkages between surges in capital inflows and 
financial excess are not limited to emerging markets, as the post-2007 wave of crises in advanced 
economies attest.4   
Capital controls notwithstanding, China has faced in recent years and continues to do so 
many of the challenges posed by this environment. Much of the discussion complements 
concerns raised by Lardy (2012) about various dimensions of financial sector fragility and its 
implications for the real economy in the period ahead while adding some elements from a 
historical and international comparison. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews well-
known trends and developments in capital flows, international reserve accumulation, domestic 
credit, and real estate prices for China.  We then discuss the conceptual interaction between 
exchange rate regimes and capital flows and credit growth patterns while revisiting the existing 
literature. The main empirical findings on these links are summarized.  Section III takes up the 
question of do capital inflow bonanzas and credit booms make economies more crisis prone. We 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), and references therein. 
3 Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004). 
4 See Reinhart and  Rogoff (2009). 
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distinguish between studies focusing on the inflows proper and those primarily concerned with 
domestic credit cycles as well as between banking and inflation crises to sketch the main 
empirical findings in this literature. Section IV discusses the recurring theme in crisis episodes of 
“hidden debts” an issue particularly germane to China’s current conjuncture. The big question is 
whether, taken together, these developments describe the antecedents of a banking crisis with its 
potential consequences for economic activity or a milder, soft landing. 
II. Capital Flows and Credit: 
Well-Known Trends and Less Well-Known Interactions 
 
 In the context of China (or any country with a fixed exchange rate), the discussion of 
domestic credit booms is intimately connected to exchange rate policy and, specifically, to 
foreign exchange market intervention, and whether the intervention is sterilized or not.  
1. Reserve accumulation and domestic credit 
From the basic balance-of-payments accounting identity, capital inflows (a surplus in the 
capital account) are associated with either a deficit in the current account, an accumulation of 
central bank reserves or any combination of the two.5  In Thailand in the 1990s, for example, the 
capital inflows were associated predominantly with widening current account deficits while in 
China the flows have been associated with a sharp reserve buildup. 
The aims of sterilized intervention are twofold.6  The intervention in the foreign exchange 
market is designed to prevent, or at least damp, nominal exchange rate appreciation that would 
otherwise accompany the capital inflow.  Meanwhile, an accompanying sale of securities in the 
                                                 
5 The simple rules of double-entry accounting ensure that, up to statistical discrepancies, the capital account surplus 
or net capital inflow (denoted by KA) Is related to the current account surplus (denoted by CA) and to the official 
reserves account (denoted by RA) of the balance of payments through the identity: KA+CA+RA ≡ 0, where RA < 0 
implies an accumulation of reserves by the monetary authority. 
6 See Reinhart and Reinhart (1998) for an extensive discussion of sterilization policies. 
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domestic open market drains domestic reserves so as to offset the effects on total reserves--and 
hence the money supply--that would otherwise ensue from the central bank's accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves.  Other methods of sterilization usually involve increases in reserve 
requirements.  These do not reduce the impact of reserve accumulation on base money but 
instead reduce the money multiplier and the accompanying impacts on broad money and credit 
creation.  In China (see Lardy, 2008 and 2012), as in many emerging markets (EMs), reserve 
requirements have been an active component of the policy tool kit to deal with the effects of 
capital inflows. A less frequent method of sterilization involves the transfer of government 
deposits from the banking sector to the central bank—thus, in effect, placing a 100 percent 
reserve requirement on these deposits. 
A policy “lesson” distilled from a review of exchange rate and monetary policy during past 
cycles of capital inflows (see Reinhart and Reinhart, 1998) through the 1990s is that despite 
persistent efforts by the monetary authorities and a variety methods of sterilization, the 
expansionary effects of reserve accumulation on the monetary aggregates is seldom (if ever) 
fully offset by liquidity draining efforts.   
Figure 1 traces China’s unparalleled accumulation of foreign exchange reserves (excluding 
gold) since 1980.  While the dollar magnitudes of the reserve accumulation rise exponentially, as 
the figure makes plain, the log scale shown in the inset points to a steady rate of accumulation, 
which lends itself to smoother absorption in the rapidly growing economy. 
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Figure 1. China: International Reserves Excluding Gold, 1981-2011 
(billions of US dollars) 
 
Sources: Bloomberg and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
 As noted previously, the full sterilization of a rapid reserve build-up has seldom been 
achieved in the broad range of capital inflow episodes (even in cases where it may have been 
desirable) and China’s case is no exception in this regard.  
Thus, over the same three-decade period shown in Figure 1, domestic credit both in real 
terms and as a share of GDP has been climbing markedly (Figure 2).  In effect Figure 2 
understates by a significant margin the extent of credit expansion, as lending in the informal 
sector has soared during the latter part of the sample (see Lardy (2008) for a summary of Li 
Jianzhun, (2008) study on the size of the underground lending).   
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 As with capital inflows, a rising ratio of domestic credit to GDP evidences financial 
deepening, often positively connected to long term growth, as highlighted by Ross Levine in 
several studies. As with capital inflow bonanzas, credit booms often end badly and are a regular 
precursor of full blown financial crises--the evidence on this theme is reviewed in the next 
section). Both inflow surges and credit booms are a “mixed blessing.” 
Figure 2.China: Domestic Credit as a Percent of GDP and Banking Crisis, 1978-2010  
(in percent) 
 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook, National 
Statistics Bureau of China, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
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 While the rise in private debt burdens is evident from Figure 2, it is useful to place 
China’s experience in a comparative international setting. To that end, Table 1 documents the 
changes in domestic credit/GDP over 1978-2010 (the full period for which the IMF reports 
domestic bank credit data for China) and for 1997-2010, from the onset of the Asian crisis to the 
most recent data.7  Apart from the calculations for China, we report the comparable changes for 
sub groups of advanced economies (reporting separately the countries which had financial crises 
in 2007-2009) and for emerging markets.  
Among the salient points is that the only group posting larger increases in credit/GDP 
than China over these periods is the advanced economies that ended their credit booms and 
accompanying real estate bubbles in spectacular financial crises. For the Asian 1997-1998 
crises countries, the low credit numbers for the entire period (1978-2010) mask the sharp 
credit booms prior to the 1997 crisis and reflect the sharp deleveraging post 1997, as the last 
column and Figure 4 makes plain.8 
  
                                                 
7 Monthly data for 2011 is available for most of the countries in the table but the end-month is uneven. 
8 See Reinhart and Reinhart (2010). 
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Table1. Changes in Domestic Credit/GDP: Selected Countries, 1978-2010 
(in percent) 
 
Country 
 
 
1978-2010 
 
1997-2010 
   
China 109.1 46.9 
   
Selected advanced economies   
Australia 99.0 60.3 
Austria 58.4 6.8 
Finland 57.9 45.5 
France 52.7 32.4 
Germany 42.1 -5.8 
Japan (crisis in 1991) 70.7 18.9 
Average 63.47 26.35 
   
Selected emerging markets   
Argentina (crisis in 2001) -6.4 -1.2 
Brazil 53.2 39.4 
Chile 31.2 9.2 
India 39.0 29.3 
South Africa 30.1 21.1 
Average 29.42 19.56 
   
1997-1998 crisis countries   
Indonesia 15.7 -24.0 
Korea 67.5 41.8 
Thailand 50.7 -68.5 
Average 44.63 -16.9 
   
2007-2009 crisis countries   
Greece 74.5 65.0 
Ireland 194.3 146.3 
Italy 37.7 52.4 
Portugal 109.4 37.1 
Spain 138.0 129.1 
United Kingdom 186.1 102.0 
United States 108.2 43.7 
Average 121.17 82.23 
Notes: For the United States based on total private debt  (bank and nonbank) from the Flow of Funds.  
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2. Exchange rate regimes and the capital flow-domestic credit link  
         Complementing the study of past capital flow cycles in Reinhart and Reinhart (1998 and 
2008), Magud, Reinhart, and Vesperoni (2011) (MRV) examine 25 emerging markets through 
the last capital inflow cycle to emerging Europe that ended abruptly in 2008. The focus of that 
study is examining the association between domestic credit, capital inflows and the exchange 
rate regime. The main empirical results are anticipated in Figure 3 through cross-plot charts:9 
 Figure 3, panel (a) presents evidence that credit to the private sector is higher in 
economies with less flexible exchange regimes. (Appendix Table 1 summarizes the exchange 
rate regime categories, which range from the least flexible-category 1 to the most flexible-
category 6. 
 Panel (b) shows that there seems to be a significant relationship between the share of 
credit in foreign currency credit and exchange rate regimes, with a higher share in economies 
with less flexible arrangements. 
 Panel (c) documents that capital flows are higher in economies with less flexible 
exchange rate regimes. The scatter, though, suggests that this relationship may be associated 
with a few outliers in very inflexible regimes.10 
 MRV show that, during capital inflow bonanzas, credit grows more rapidly in economies 
with relatively inflexible exchange rate regimes.  Studies on the economic performance of 
different exchange regimes have tended to focus on growth, inflation, fiscal policies, and current 
account adjustments, but have been relatively silent on the evolution of domestic credit.  In a 
related paper, Mendoza and Terrones (2011) show that capital inflows surge before the peak in 
                                                 
9 For the full empirical analysis, the interested reader is referred to the original paper. 
10 See appendix Figure 1, exchange rate classifications from Reinhart and Rogoff (2003)  1 and 2. 
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credit booms, and that these latter have a higher frequency under less flexible exchange rate 
regimes. KRV discuss and document why and how this relationship between capital inflows, 
domestic credit, and exchange rate regimes works through banking intermediation. These 
developments in credit could potentially be exclusively explained if countries with more rigid 
exchange rate arrangements tend to record larger capital inflows. However, by analyzing the 
relationship of the ratio of capital flows to GDP and the exchange rate regime, we do not find 
compelling evidence that this is the case.  
11 
 
  
Figure 3. Exchange Rate Flexibility, Credit, and Capital Flows
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3. Policy questions 
MRV go on to suggest that on the basis of their findings that some of the most relevant 
tools to counteract lack of exchange rate flexibility (apart from the obvious implication of 
allowing for greater exchange rate flexibility) include: 
Currency-dependent liquidity requirements—maybe even combining them with marginal 
reserve requirements on external wholesale financing. Both contain credit and reduce incentives 
to borrow in foreign currency by reducing the interest rate differential between loans in domestic 
and foreign currency. Increasing reserve requirements across the board or imposing limits on 
external borrowing by the banking sector may of course also reduce domestic credit growth.  
Increasing capital requirements for FX loans and/or introducing dynamic provisioning on 
FX loans (i.e. provisions increase as the share of FX loan over the total increases). These would 
place incentives for banks to internalize the higher credit risk associated with potential 
borrowers’ currency mismatches. They would also facilitate the building of buffers to cope with 
capital flows reversals. 
Tightening debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios (conditional on the debts’ currency 
denomination) would also contribute to contain domestic credit directly, and might be more 
effective than traditional monetary tightening—i.e. increasing domestic interest rates. 
However, for a comprehensive discussion of post-financial crisis macroprudential regulation 
aimed at curbing credit booms, asset price bubbles and financial sector vulnerability more 
generally, Goldstein (2012) provides carity on both the nature of the general discussion as well 
as what it could imply for China. 
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4. Attendant Real Estate Booms 
 
Credit booms have historically been accompanied by asset price booms; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) document this for equities. Surges in the prices of equity, real estate, or both 
marketshave accompanied cycles of rising leverage. Recent historical work by Schularick and 
Taylor (2011) documents how this pattern pre-dates the post-WWII era.  Yet, it is surprising how 
many contemporary observers believed the U.S. housing price bubble during 2000–2006 
(primarily) to be both unique and unprecedented.  The magnitude of the bubble was certainly 
unprecedented to the United States—at least during the past century for which we have 
comparable data. However, in a broader global context, the subprime housing bubble experience 
is not unique to the United States; nor is it magnitudes out of line with other real estate bubbles 
that have also ended equally lamentably in financial crises.   
Figure 4 compares the run-up in housing prices during 2002-2006 during the runup to the 
subprime crisis that begins to unfold in the summer of 2007.  The red bars highlight the (many) 
countries where the surge in real housing prices culminated in a systemic banking during 2007-
2009 other countries shown also experienced milder financial distress.  In many of these cases, 
five years after the onset of the crises housing prices have yet to stabilize, with Ireland and Spain 
posting some of significant declines in the most recent data.  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
document how pre-crises booms and post-crisis collapses were an integral feature of all the 
major financial crises (in both advanced and emerging economies) where the real estate data is 
available.  For the RR sample the average peak-to-trough decline lasts six years and amounts to a 
cumulative decline of about 36 percent. For Japan, since the start of its major banking crisis in 
1991 nationwide prices of urban residential land has declined every year through 2011. 
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Since January 2003, when the data series start through the May 2010 peak, Shanghai 
prices of existing homes (in real terms) rose by about 100 percent. Since then prices have 
fallen by about 7 percent. While moderate price declines are a welcome sign of “cooling off” 
after a surge (or bubble), a more marked slide in real estate prices has historically been a 
harbinger of banking sector problems. It is one of the indicators with the highest predictive 
ability (lowest noise-to-signal ratio).11 
  
                                                 
11 On the “predictive” ability of asset prices, Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), who rank the predictive 
ability of numerous financial and economic indicators, find that equity prices have one of the lowest noise to signal 
ratios and figure at the top of the list in predictive ability.  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) add real estate prices to the 
GKR approach and find that real estate prices score even higher. 
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Figure 4. Percent Change in Real Housing Prices (2002–2006) and Banking Crises, 2007-2009
 
 
Source: Ehomeday, National Statistics Bureau of China, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and author’s calculations. 
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III. Do Capital Flow Bonanzas and Credit Booms Make Countries More Crisis Prone? 
 Are capital flow bonanzas a blessing or a curse?  Or, for that matter, are they neutral as 
regards their role in making financial crises more likely or more severe?  The literature is filled 
with famous case studies of capital flow bonanzas that ended in spectacular crises. The papers 
range from the infamous episodes in the Southern Cone in the late 1970s-early 1980s  (see, for 
instance, Diaz Alejandro’s 1985 classic) to Calvo and Talvi (2005), who place great store in the 
capital flow sudden stop following the Russian 1998 crisis in explaining Argentina’s subsequent 
crash.  Rather than focusing on specific episodes that are either as famous or more obscure, in 
this section we systematically examine the potential links between the likelihood of a capital 
inflow bonanza and financial crises.   Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) investigate this issue for 
capital flows; Mendoza and Terrones (2008 and 2011) Reinhart and Reinhart (2010), and 
Schularick and Taylor (2011) for domestic credit booms. 
1. Capital flow bonanzas and financial crises 
Capital flow bonanzas are catalogued, country-by-country in Reinhart and Reinhart 
(2008) and financial crises definitions in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  From the crises and the 
bonanza dates, Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) constructed a family of country-specific 
probabilities.  For each of the 64 countries in their sample, this implies four unconditional crisis 
probabilities, that of: default (or restructuring) on external sovereign debt, a currency crash, an 
inflation crisis, and a banking crisis.  They also construct the probability of each type of crisis 
within a window of three years before and after the bonanza year or years--the conditional 
probability of a crisis.  If capital flow bonanzas make countries more crises prone, the 
17 
 
conditional probability, P(Crisis│Bonanza) should be greater than the unconditional probability 
of a crisis, P(Crisis).  
For the purposes of discussing China’s possible vulnerabilities, as neither an external 
currency crisis nor a sovereign default on external debt appear remotely probable, given the 
extremely low levels of gross total (public plus private) external indebtedness (especially relative 
to liquid international reserves), current account surpluses, and the extensive capital controls. 
Thus, only the main results for “internal” crises (banking and inflation) are summarized here. 
It is important to remember in this context, that Japan’s two-decade long banking and real 
estate crisis as well as China’s banking crisis of the 1990s largely connected to lending to 
unprofitable state-owned enterprises were wholly of a domestic nature.  
One of RR (2008) main results for the full sample is that the probability of any of the 
four varieties of crises conditional on a capital flow bonanza is significantly higher than the 
unconditional probability.  Put differently, the incidence of a financial crisis is higher around 
a capital inflow bonanza.   
 Figures 5 and 6 banking and inflation crises, respectively, present a comparison of 
conditional and unconditional probabilities for individual countries, where the differences in 
crisis probabilities were greatest.  (Hence, the country list varies from one figure to the next).  
While the advanced economies register much lower (conditional and unconditional) crisis 
probabilities than their lower income counterparts, the likelihood of crisis is higher around 
bonanza episodes in several instances.  Notably, Finland and Norway record a higher probability 
of a banking crisis. A recent update of this exercise to encompass the recent crises yields the 
18 
 
results for the advanced economies that are both quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those 
of emerging markets. 
 
 
Figure 5. Are bonanza episodes more crisis prone? Banking crises:  
66 countries, 1960-2007 
 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Reinhart (2009), and sources cited therein. 
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Figure 6.  Are bonanza episodes more crisis prone? Inflation crises:  
66 countries, 1960-2007 
 
 
 
 
2. Credit booms and crises 
 
The link between credit booms and crises began to be investigated in earnest following the 
Mexican banking and currency crash of late 1994-1995 and the subsequent Asian crisis in 1997-
1998.  For nearly a decade (until the outbreak of the subprime crises) little academic work was 
done on the subject and recently the topic has again regained scrutiny and popularity. 
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In earlier papers, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000) using the “signals” approach to develop an early warnings system identify “abnormal” 
increases in credit/GDP among the leading indicators of both banking and currency crises. They 
also find that 12-month changes in real equity prices (which are themselves correlated with the 
credit boom) rank highly for a large sample of emerging market and a smaller sample of 
advanced economy crises. Gourinchas,Valdes and Landerretche (2001), working with a sample 
of Latin American countries, however, concluded that there is little connection between lending 
booms and busts and crises.  Their definition and dating of credit cycles differed from that used 
in the “signals approach” papers and was subsequently critically questioned by Mendoza and 
Terrones (2008), (MT) who examine nearly fifty credit booms in a large sample of advanced and 
emerging market economies.  Mendoza and Terrones (2008) conclude that while it is clear that 
not all credit booms end in crises, nearly all financial crises are preceded by credit booms (in line 
with the early results of the “signals” approach).  In that paper, in which the macroeconomic data 
was complemented by a micro firm-level database, they ended the sample in 2006 and (not 
surprisingly) they concluded that the link between credit booms and subsequent financial crises 
was more pronounced in emerging markets than in advanced economies. 
In an update and extension of their work, Mendoza and Terrones (2011), after incorporating 
post-2007 data and crises episodes reach the conclusion that the differences between advanced 
and emerging economies (in terms of credit booms ending in crises) has all but disappeared.  
Schularick and Taylor (2011) in several very recent papers enrich this analysis by extending the 
sample for 12 advanced economies back to 1870.  This extension is of interest for China, as the 
long sample (about 140 years) also captures an era when many of the now advanced economies 
were growing more rapidly and when capital account mobility was much lower throughout much 
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of the sample than in the past three decades.  Crisis or not, a key finding is that credit booms and 
busts importantly influence cycles in real economic activity, in a consistent way across time; the 
same cannot be said of monetary aggregates, which seem to have lost their earlier connection 
with output.  In a subsequent paper, Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor (2011) concludes that credit 
growth emerges as the single best predictor of financial instability. Having examined the 
indicator properties of many economic and financial series (see Goldstein, Kaminsk, and 
Reinhart, 2000). This result appears somewhat overstated and colored by their more limited 
choice of alternative indicators.  Nonetheless, taken as a whole this literature clearly suggests 
that credit booms have a distinct element of danger.   
To illustrate this point with well-known crises episodes, Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) argue 
in their Jackson Hole paper that while monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies differed 
markedly (before, during, and after crisis) across episodes, the common thread was a sharp build-
up in leverage that spans a decade or more followed by a protracted period of deleveraging after 
a banking crisis that lasts, on average seven years.  Figure 7, taken from this study, focuses on 
the amplitude of the fluctuations.  The top bar measures the increase in domestic credit/GDP 
from the minimum credit ratio in the 10-year window prior to the crisis (often the date for this 
minimum turns out to be t-10) to the maximum value reached usually shortly before, during or 
shortly after the financial crisis.12   
As is evident, the increases in credit/GDP in the run-up to the crisis vary in size, with 
surges in the 80-to-90 percent range before the crisis in Chile (1981) and Thailand (1997); 
among the advanced economies, Japan (1992) holds the record, with an increase of about 70 
                                                 
12 Korea is an exception, in that the secular rise in domestic credit/GDP is largely uninterrupted by the 1997-1998 
crisis.  This pattern is very different from the very clear pre-crisis boom and post-crisis bust in external debt/GDP 
for Korea during the same period. 
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percent.13  The median rise in domestic bank credit/GDP across these episodes is about 38 
percent.  Quite often, this leverage ratio continues to increase immediately after the crisis, 
despite the fact that a credit crunch is underway.  During this stage of the crisis, sharp declines in 
nominal GDP (not matched by comparable write-downs in outstanding credits) importantly 
account for increases in the ratio of credit to GDP.  Typically, the greater the unwillingness (or 
inability) to write down nonperforming debts, the longer the deleveraging process is delayed.14  
This pattern is most evident in post-crisis Japan, where credit/GDP continues to climb until 1996, 
peaking at 260.5 percent.   
Figure 7.  Domestic Banking Credit/GDP Twenty-one Years Around Severe Financial Crises: 
Amplitude of Boom-Bust Credit Cycles in fifteen Post WWII Episodes 
                                                 
13 In effect, the rapid rise in leverage pre-dates our 10-year window, which begins in 1982 for Japan. 
14 In Mexico, for example, poorly defined consumer rights delayed the adjustment in the mortgage market following 
the 1994-1995crisis. 
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Sources:  Reinhart and  Reinhart (2010) and sources and authors’ calculations listed therein. 
Notes:  The magnitude of credit booms shown correspond to the difference between the maximum domestic bank 
credit-GDP ratio around the crisis and the pre-crisis low for the ratio during the 10-year window preceding the crisis.   
Similarly the extent of deleveraging is calculated as the minimum credit/GDP ratio reached during the 10-year 
window after the crisis and the maximum ratio reached around the crisis.  For Korea, there is an uninterrupted 
secular rise in domestic bank credit-to-GDP during 1987-2007 (the 10-year window around the crisis).  Post-crisis 
deleveraging appears to be confined to external debts (see Reinhart, 2010). 
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IV. “Hidden Debts” 
“There are four things every person has more of than they know; sins, debt, years, and foes.” 
-Persian Proverb 
 I will only focus on the second item in that list. Thus far, we have dealt with debt that is 
seen and, more or less accurately.  However, oftentimes in crises debt overhangs appear from 
seemingly nowhere. It is not a new phenomenon. Writing about Chile’s crises in the early 1980s, 
Diaz Alejandro (1985) was ahead of the curve as he wrote about the problem of government’s 
contingent liabilities in the banking sector. He asked us to consider a country where  
“The recorded public sector deficit was nonexistent, miniscule, or moderate; the 
declining importance of ostensible public debt in the national balance sheet was 
celebrated by some observers.”  
The private sector and local governments was a different matter. There was a credit 
boom, real estate and equity prices soared—so did debts. Growth seemed inevitable. 
However, as Diaz Alejandro explains, the pity of the boom is that  
“little effort was spent on investigating the credentials of new entrants to the ever-
growing pool of lenders and borrowers…practically no inspection or supervision of bank 
portfolios existed…” 
After the onset of the asset price decline, banking sectors were riddled with high debts (of 
which a sizable share was nonperforming) and low levels of capitalization, while household 
sector has significant exposures to a depressed real estate market.  
25 
 
Under such conditions, the migration of private debts to the public sector balance sheets 
has been a common recurring feature of banking crises.  
Hidden debts thus fall into a variety of categories, some of which are more relevant to 
China’s case than others. 
The liabilities from unfunded (or underfunded) pension schemes. This is a source of 
hidden debts on a massive scale for most advanced economies. Given marked differences in 
demographics and social safety net schemes, this is less of an issue for emerging market 
economies. 
Contingent liabilities from private debts (most often the banking sector). This has been 
and continues to be a major issue for many advanced economies in the ongoing crisis, Iceland, 
Ireland and to a lesser degree Spain, all three which had a major private credit boom ahead of the 
crisis, stand out in this regard.  An a-priori unknown share of China’s bank debts (particularly 
those connected to real estate) are candidates for this class of “hidden debt.”  Even when private 
debt are measured with precision (a rare occurrence) the share that will wind up in the public 
hands is difficult to gauge until after the fact. 
Debts of local, state or provincial governments. Historically these debts have been “less 
than precisely” measured, as the degree of securitization is far lower than for central government 
and the incidence of off balance sheet items is usually higher. In China, this is compounded by 
credit transactions in the informal market, or shadow banking sector. Debts of provincial and 
local governments, which remained largely “hidden” during the boom phase of the cycle also 
begin to clutter the central government’s balance sheet.  The Argentine provinces were notorious 
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in the regard during the crisis of 2001 as well as the Barings crisis of 1890.  Several of Spain’s 
provinces are reminiscent of this problem at present. 
 Central bank debts. Seldom is the debt issued by the central bank, for example, for  
sterilization of foreign exchange purchases, accounted in a manner comparable to central 
government debt. A different variation of hidden central bank debt’s was Bank of Thailand’s 
large off-balance sheet derivative position in the foreign exchange market on the eve of the 1997 
crisis. 
 The unofficial “shadow banking sector, which in the case of China, as discussed, has 
reached significant proportions. In several of the crises episodes studies in Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009), the activities of finance companies (and their portfolios) were only marginally 
understood until asset price collapses revealed their weaknesses. 
 “Below-the-line arrears” at all levels of government-although more common place at the 
local and provincial levels accumulate rapidly ahead of and during crisis, a payments are 
delayed, missed or made only partially.  This is a nontrivial type of “hidden debts” at present in 
much of periphery Europe. It is also an issue for US states like California and Illinois. 
Conclusions 
Writing about the incipient decline in housing prices and the mounting financial stress 
Unites States in January of 2008 Ken Rogoff  and I concluded:  
 “Tolstoy famously begins his classic novel Anna Karenina with “Every happy family is 
alike, but every unhappy family is unhappy in their own way.”   While each financial crisis no 
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doubt is distinct, they also share striking similarities, in the run-up of asset prices, in debt 
accumulation, in growth patterns, and in current account deficits… 
…Perhaps the United States will prove a different kind of happy family.  Despite many 
superficial similarities to a typical crisis country, it may yet suffer a growth lapse comparable 
only to the mildest cases.  Perhaps this time will be different as so many argue.  Nevertheless, the 
quantitative and qualitative parallels in run-ups to earlier post-war industrialized-country 
financial crises are worthy of note.    
… Finally, we note that although this paper has concentrated on the United States, many 
of the same parallels hold for other countries that began experiencing housing price duress 
during the 2007, including Spain, the United Kingdom and Ireland.  There can be similarities 
across unhappy families, too.” 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) 
 As noted earlier, current account deficits and external indebtedess are not a part of the 
landscape for China; these were also not part of the landscape for Japan in 1991 and are not a 
“prerequisite” for a domestic banking crisis. Britain had several major financial crises in the 
1800s while it was lender and banker to the rest of the world.  Perhaps the decline in equity and 
real estate prices underway in China is a modest and welcome correction and not part of a more 
significant reversal.  From a policy standpoint, however, it appears prudent to prepare for the 
worst while hoping for the best.  To that end, quantifying, accounting, consolidating, and 
provisioning for the many loose ends associated with visible and hidden debts appears as a 
reasonable starting point. 
 
28 
 
References 
Backe, P. and C. Wojcik (2008), “Credit Booms, Monetary Integration, and the Neoclassical 
Synthesis,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 458-470. 
Bubula, A., and I. Ötker-Robe (2003), “Are Pegged and Intermediate Regimes More Crisis 
Prone?” IMF Working Paper 03/223 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
Calvo, Guillermo A., and Ernesto Talvi, “Sudden Stop, Financial Factors and Economic 
Collapse in Latin America: Learning from Argentina and Chile,”   NBER Working Paper 11153, 
February 2005. 
Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos. “Good-Bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash.” Journal of 
Development Economics, 19(1/2), February 1985, 1-24. 
Goldstein, M., G.Kaminsky, and C. Reinhart (2000). ,Assessing Financial Vulnerability: An 
Early Warning System for Emerging Markets (with Morris, (Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics). 
Goldstein, M. (2012), “Financial Regulation and Reform After the Crisis,” paper prepared for the 
CF40-PIIE Conference, Beijing, April 26-28. 
Jordà, O., M. Schularick and A. Taylor “When Credit Bites Back: Leverage, Business Cycles, 
and Crises” NBER WP 17621 
Kaminsky, G., C. Reinhart, and C. Végh (2004), “When It Rains, It Pours: Procyclical Capital 
Flows and Macroeconomic Policies,” NBER Working Paper 10780.  
Lardy, N. (2008) “Financial Repression in China,” Peterson Institute Policy Brief Number PB 
08-8se, Spetember. 
Lardy, N. (2012). Sustaining China's Economic Growth after the Global Financial Crisis 
(Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, January). 
Li Jianzhun (2008) “Irregular Credit Completely Offsets the Retrenchment Gap,” China 
Economic Management Report, July. 
Magud, N., C. Reinhart, and E. Vesperoni, “Capital Inflows, Exchange Rate Flexibility, and 
Credit Booms” NBER Working Paper 17670, December 2011. 
Mendoza, E. and M. Terrones (2008), “An Anatomy of Credit Booms: Evidence from Macro 
Aggregates and Micro Data,” NBER Working Paper 14049. 
29 
 
Mendoza, E. and M. Terrones (2011), “An Anatomy of Credit Booms and their Demise” 
mimeograph, University of Maryland, November. 
Reinhart, C. and V. Reinhart (1998) “Some Lessons for Policy Makers Who Deal with the Mixed 
Blessing of Capital Inflows,” in Miles Kahler, ed. Capital Flows and Financial Crises, (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press), 93-127. 
Reinhart, C. and V. Reinhart (2008), “Capital Flow Bonanzas: An Encompassing View of the 
Past and Present,” in Jeffrey Frankel and Francesco Giavazzi (eds.) NBER International Seminar 
in Macroeconomics 2008, (Chicago: Chicago University Press for the NBER, 2009). 1-54. 
Reinhart, C. and V. Reinhart (2010), “After the Fall,” forthcoming in Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City Economic Policy Symposium, Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead at 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on August 26-28, 2010. 
Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2004), “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements:  A 
Reinterpretation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1):1-48, February. 
Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2008) “Is The 2007 U.S. Subprime Crisis So Different? An, 
International Historical Comparison,” American Economic Review, Vol. 98 No. 2, May 2008, 
339-344. 
Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2009), This Time It’s Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, September). 
Schularick, M. and A. Taylor “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and 
Financial Crises, 1870–2008” forthcoming in the American Economic Review 
  
30 
 
Appendix  
 
 
1 No separate legal tender
1 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement
1 Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
1 De facto peg
2 Pre announced crawling peg
2 Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
2 De factor crawling peg
2 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
3 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%
3 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%
3 Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and 
depreciation over time)
3 Managed floating
4 Freely floating
5 Freely falling
6 Dual market in which parallel market data is missing.
 Figure 1. Exchange Rate Regimes - Coarse Classification
